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La.tin America in Depressio n, 1929-1939
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro*
Yale Universit y
'Ihe 1930s are widely regarded as a crucial turning point in La.tin

American development:

it marks the start of :1mport substitut ing indus

trializat ion and of public policy clearly carrmitted to growth and other
social objective s. The contrast between "before and after 1929" is often
exaggerated., but there is little doubt that the events of the 1930s
have profoundly influence d the region's attitudes toward foreign trade
and finance.

It has been generally recognize d that several Latm

American countries performed "reasonab ly well" during the Great Depression
of this century., and different hypotheses have been advanced to explain

such behavior.

Perhaps the flashiest one has been that of Andre Gunder

Frank., who arg-..,es that the La.tin American 1930s demonstrate

that contrary

to neoclassi cal orthodoX"J the Periphery industria lizes and prospers only
when the Center is weak and unable to :maintain its :imperial and under
developin g dominanc e)! Also influence d by the Latin J!merican experienc e
during world wars and depressio ns., Albert 0. Hirschman had earlier noted
that fluctuatio ns in foreig!'l exchange receipts of less developed countries
may set in motion certain valuable development mechar..isms. 21 Alexander
Kafka referred to the Great Depression as a11 example of growth-promoting
disequilib rium under sane La.tin American c:LT'Cumstances; in a manner
similar to H:!.rschrr.a~ he conjectur ed that there is an optimum degree
of adverse shock, without :1mplying that an adverse shock is better
) I

than a favorable one.~

In \o.'hat follows the rr.agn.itude of the shock of the Great Depressio n

to Latin A'T.erica will first he documented.

Secondly, the policies

-2adopted to cope with the crisis will be discussed.

Then the performance

of various La.tin American economies will be explored, and the sense
1n which they did reasonably well will be analyzed.

Sundry observations

will close the paper.
Fran the outside Latin .American countries

may

all look the same

but the region, even in the late 1920s, contained a variety of open
econanies sorne of which were less open and more industrialized than
others.

Indeed, the 1930s witnessed different economic responses which

can be divided between those of small or passive and those of large

or active-econor.u.es. Even though statistical documentation for passive
~ountries is scantier than for active ones, this typological point will
be of importance throughout the paper.

Shocks
For a mnnber of exporters of primary products the late 1920s had
been difficult ye?,rs~ but on the whole it is useful to picture that
period as one of reasonable balance of payments equilibrit.nn in the major
Latin .Arrerican countries.

A series of violent external shocks during

1929-33 disrupted that equilibrit.nn, and inuch of the economic history
for the 1930s can be written around attempts to adjust the balance of
payments, and then the domestic economy, to the new environment.
The collapse of the world economy during 1929-33 was transmitted
to Latin America first of all by a sharp change in relative prices:
dollar export prices fell more steeply than dollar import prices.

As

can be seen in Panel A of Table 1, within four years the tenns of
trade fell by 21 to ~5 percent m countries for which comparable data
are available.2,/ Note that for a country with a ratio of exports to
Gross National Product of thirty percent a deterioration of the

-3terms of trade by thirty percent would represent a loss in real incorne
of nine percent, ·assuming no change in physical output.

As a first

approximation the deterioration of the terms of trade during 1929-33,
as well as their subsequent evolution in the 1930s may be regarded
as primarily exogenous to the Latin American economies.§!

F.xcept for the spectacular Chilean case, for the countries shown

in Table 1 the contraction in the export quantum during 1929-1933 was
substantially less than the terms of trade deterioration.

By

the

late 1930s the export quantum of several countries had surpassed the
1928-29 level, but for most countries the terms of trade for 1938-

39 remained below - relative to pre--Oepression

magnituoes.

Latin

American exports were predominantly rural and mining products,·the
former showing a smaller price~lasticit y of supply than the latter;
sane rural products, such as coffee and livestock, also followed sm.
generis output cycles rooted in their productive characteristics .
External demand conditions were not uniformly negative for all primary
products, particularly during the late 1930s; Brazilian cotton, Argentine
corn, and Peruvian gold are exanples of favored staples.

Such ccmrodity

lottery riat;urally influenced the pace of recovery.
Table 2-A presents the yearly evolution of the purchasing power
of exports, defined as the terms of trade multiplied by the export
quantum; this Table-also includes estimates for Cuba.

After touching

bottom in 1932 or 1933, recovery sets in culminating in 1936 or 1937,
after which a new relapse occurs.

By the late 1930s the purchasing

power of exports remained between 20 and 50 percent below 1929
levels.

-4Table 1
Foreign Trade Indica tors for Some Latin American Coi.mtries

(1928-29
A. Tenns of Trade
Argen tina
Brazi l
Colombia
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvad or
Mexico
Venezuela

=

100)
1932-33

1938-39

69
62
63
59
72
55
63
79

98
43
57
60
56
50
124
47

85
93
100
36
78
96
60

70
162
132
87
109
115
49
145
108

B. Exoort Quantum
Argen tina
Brazi l
Colombia
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvad or
Mexico
Venezuela
Peru

91

82

&>Urces: Basic data obtain ed _from Naciones Unida s, America Latina :
Relaci on de Precio s del Interc ambio , Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Santia go,
Chile, 1976. The terms of trade are define d as an index of dollar
expor t unit values to dollar import unit values .

Table 2-A

~ntina

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

110
100
67
69
65
58
74
78
86
115
68
76

Brazil

97
100
67
62
54
59
70
71
77
75
67
71,

Purchasing Power of Exports, 1928-39
(1929 = 100)
Colombia Cuba Chile Ecuador El Salvador

111
100
82

Bo
72
63
85
73
83
85
19

so·

101
100
68
57
43
45
50
56
67
75
64
67

91
100
62
41
16
25
38
42
47
73
48
51

114
100
91
64
68
50
82
64
77
73
64
68

110
100
60 ·
67
40
77
67
57
. 60
83
53
70

Mexico

94
100
63
49
35
39
56
68
62
69
67

52

Peru

100
66
48
43
52
71
79
80
82
68
70

Venezuela

74
100
110
71
74
48
61
39
55
58
58
58

Source: As 1n Table 1; Cuban purchasing power of exports obtained by·d1v1d1ng indices of the value
of exports at current prices by the United States wholesale price index. Ba.sic data fran Ministerio
de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica, Resumenes Estadisticos Seleccionados, La Ha.bana, 1959,
p.25; and U.S. Department of Conrnerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965, Washington,D.C. p.356

I
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-6The crisis disturbed the balance of payments also via the capital

account.

After 1930 gross capital infiows fell sharply.

Furthenoore ,

with the dollar prices of exports dropping unexpectedly by around 60
percent debt repayments rose in real terms, compressing the capacity
to import beyond what is suggested in Table 2-A.

Therefore, between

1929 and 1932-33 the import quantum fell more than the purchasing power
of exports, as ma.y be seen in Table 2-B (with the. exception of Mexico) •
By 1934 all countries, except Argentina, had suspended normal servicing

of the external national debt.

Import volumes as a rLUe recovered

much faster than the purchasing power of exports.
capital

was

Private portfolio

not.to play an important role in the external accounts

of Latin American countries until the 1960s.
D..lring

the 1920s critics of the prevailing pro-trade orthodoxy

within Latin .l\merica pointed to signs of grow:l.ne protection1 sm.at the

Center.

In Britain, imperial preferences were advocated by influential

groups; in the United States, the 1928 presidentia l election was accom
panied by a protectioni st wave.

These trends culminated with the

passage of the &noot-Hawley tariff in 1930, the British_Abnonnal
Importation s Act of 1931 and the Ottawa Corrrnonwealth preferences of
1932. .The' Latin .American Periphery, unconsult.ed regarding these measures,
could go hang.

A North .American author writing in 1935 about southern

cone countries in Latin America described the situation as follows:
"'Ihe trade barriers which have been erected in Eurooe and the
materials
United States against ar;ricultura l products and
have placed these col..lr.tries in the forefront of foreign trade
decline ••• Nationalist ic tendences are not dominant in these
countries. National leaders fully recop.;nize the desirabilit y
of a heavy volume of trade •• National self-suffici ency to a greater
and greater measure was forced upon these countries by the
1171
govern'ilental policies of the United States a"ld European nations

raw

-7Table 2-B

99!!J>ar1son of Purchasirlg Power of Exports (A) and Import Quantt.nn (B)

(1929
1928-29
Argentina A
Brazil

B

98

A

99
100
106
109
101
99
96
90
107
100
105
95
97
94
100a
100a
87
90

B

Colombia

A
B

CUba

A

B

Chile

A

B

Ecuador

A

B

El Salvador A
B

Mexico

A
B

Peru

105

A

B

Venezuela A
B

8Rerers only to 1929
Source: As 1n Table 2-A

=

1930-31
68
_75 .
.65
49.
81
49
63
66
52
70
78
67
64
50
56
61
57
62
91
57

100)
1932-33

1934-35-36

62
49
57
44
68

79
59 .
73
60
80
· 70
58
51
4_2
35
74
76
61
55
62
60
77
78
52
31

~4 .

44
32
21
18
59
43
59
45
37
42
48
39
61
35

1937-38-39
86
74
71
72
81
93
69
62
57
49
68
77
69
54
63
73
· 73
88
58
55

-8'llle energence of a protectionist and nationalistic Center was

perhaps the greatest ~hock to Latin American econanies during the
early 1930s. The rnennry of this betrayal of Ricardo would last longer
1n the Periphery than in the Center.

Policies
An ex-post description of measures taken by a group of La.tin

.American countries during the early 1930s risks attributing to
"Autonanous Policy" a series of improvisations more or less forced by
circumstances.

Yet not all countries were in a position to improvise.

· 'Ille largest ones, such as Argentina, Brazil., Colombia_ and Mexico,
were at the forefront of experimentation. The smallest countries,
such as Guatemala, Hal.ti and the Dcminican Republic did little but
wa1 t

for export-led recove!"J.

In between there is an interesting contrast

between Cuba, which was dragged down by the crisis as surely as the
Mississippi., versus.Chile and Uruguay, which in spite of their small
ness broke away from the orthodoxy of the gold-exchange standard and
free trade.
Unfortunately, data for those years are scanty, particularly for
the small or passive countries.

There is enough infonnation., ·however,

to document several of the measures taken by the large or active countries.
By the end of 1931 -the active nations were experimenting with the

balance of payments measures previously regarded as heterodox •.W As con
vertibility into gold was abandoned, exchange rates depreciated, par.

.

..

ticularly those applied to irrports. . Table
3. presents indices
of .those
.
.
.

exchange r~tes, defined as units of local cUITency per one U.S. dollar.
'Ille rates have been deflated by each country's cost-of-living index
(or other available general index) relative to the U.S. cost of living
index. The real depreciations relative to the dollar for the countries

.

-9Table 3

Average Real Import Exchange Rates
(1929 = 100)

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay

1925-29
101.5
100.2
100.5a
98.8
103.0
98.6b
101.3

1930-34
137.2
173.2
186.7
145.6
136.4
153.8
155.8

1935-39
133.2
186.0
175.3
158.6
140.0
153.1 ·
160.3

~fers only to 1928 and 1929
bRefers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929

Sources and method: For definitio ns see text. Basic data
obtained from League of Nations yearbooks
and national sources.

shown range from 36 percent to 87 percent.

The depreciation trend

appears to have been unaffected by whether a cotmtry was politically
rooving Left (Mexico, Colombia) or Right (Argentina, Uruguay).
As may be deduced from Table 4, most of the swing in the real

import exchange rates arose fran

norrd.nal

depreciations, which had a

surprisingly small effect on price levels.

Nevertheless, for all

cotmtries shovm, price indices for 1935-39 were hi€:J1er than that
of the USA.
For the passive cotmtries one may conjecture that there was no
such_ real depreciation of the import exchange rates.

Sane

of these

cotmtries (Cuba, Panama) did not even have a Central Bank,while
_others (Guatemala, Haiti) maintained their peg to the U.S. dollar
throughout the crisis and on the whole rema:1ned conmitted to gold
exchange standard rules.
'lhe real depreciation of the Argentine peso during the 1930s

can_ be doc1..1m=nted roore fully_ !'ran three additional angles : when
other deflators are used, with respect to the British potmd, and for
the export rate.

Table 5 presents these .. calculations.

It

be

may

noted that the real depreciation is smaller when wholesale price 1ndices
are used as defiators, a not surprising result when consider1ng the

heavier weight of tradable goods in that index in contrast with cost
of living indices. For 1930-33 the depreciation is larger with respect
to the dollar than to the potmd; for later years this is reversed when
cost of l~ving indices are used as defiators.

After 1933 a

gap

between import and export rates, but the most remarkable fact

appears

in the

light of later experience.is that the real average export rate does not

-11Table 4
Cost of Living Indices

(1929

=

100)

1925-29

1930-34

1935-39

.Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay

100.8
96.9
99.2a
101.4
95.7
106.6b
98.7

86.4
74.5
112.1
65.9
87.1
87.9
96.7

89.8
94.o
155.5
90.3
lll.4
93.3
98.2

USA

101.4

83.9

81.6

8Rerers only to 1928 and 1929
bRefers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929
Sources and method: As in Table 3

Table~
Atwntine Aver8$!ft Real Exchange Rates, 1925-1939 ·
(1929 = 100)
IX>llar

Cost of Livin,:r,
Imports
Exports
1925-29
193~33
1934-36
1937-39

101.6
135.1
139.7
131.3

-

124.2
120.0

Wholesale Prices
Imports
~orts

Potmd Sterl~
Cost.of Living
Wholesale Prices
Exports . Imports
Imports
~orts

-

99.5a 112.9
105.0
117.9
100.4
109.2

102.3
126.7

-

-

160.7
147.6

143.1
135.4

-

115.8
113.1

101.5a .
100.7
103.1
103.9

8Refers to 1926-29·on1y
Sources: "Exchange rates and terms of trade in the Argentine Republic, 1913-1976"
op cit, Tables 1 and 2

....I\JI
I

-13appreciate in spite of gloorey world market conditions. Special taxes
and trading aITangeIIEnts becarre conmonplace for traditional exports,
but the maintenance of a reasonable real export exchange rate left
the door open for new nontraditional exports when external circumstances
pennitted.
Exchange rate devaluations were not the only :rreasures undertaken
by the active countries to restore balance of payments equilibrium:

there was also increased tariffs, irrport and exchange controls and, as
noted for Argentina, nw.tiple exchange rates. . Contrary to what would .
happen in the late 1940s and 1950s, exchange rate and protectionist
policies reinforced each other as import-repressing mechanisms.

Indeed,

by the mid-1930s in many of the active countries there may have been

P.T. Ellsworth
argued this.point in his valuable study of Chile in depression. 91

sore redundancy in this fonn:idable battery of measures;

has

For the Colombian case, David S.C. Chu has argued that most of the
change between 1927 and 1936 in the price of imported nontraditional
manufactures was due to the devaluation of the peso rather than tariff
·
10/
increases.- This does not deny that for some industries increases
in effective protection played an important stimulative role; examples

for Colombia include cement, soap, and rayon textiles.
'Ihe small passive countries appear to have been as inpotent

regarding protection as with exchange rate management.

Cuba actually

lowered tariffs in 1934, undoing much of the protectionist effect of
the anana.lous Tariff Act of 1927.

'lhis action was undertaken as part

of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1934 with the United States; the United

States lowered tariffs for 35 Cuban products while Cuba granted reductions
on 426 1terns.

The

United States Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934

inposed quotas on imports from Cuba, although setting a premium
over the prevailing world price to assure deliveries and protect pro
ducers in the United States.

The Cuban share of the U.S. sugar

market was 52 percent during 1926-30, falling to 29 percent in 1935-39.
'Ihe U.S. share in all Cuban imports rose fran 60 percent in 1926-30
to 68 percent in 1935-39. 111 Even larger countries were pressured
into reversing some of their early tariff increases; wielding the
threat of Corrm::>nwealth preferences and import quotas on rneat,the United
Kingda~ obtained tariff concessions from Argentina under the contro
versial Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933.

Argentine tariff revenues

expressed as·a percentage of the value of merchandise imports, which
had increased from 17 percent in 1929 to 29 percent in 1933, fell

to 22-23 percent in subsequent years. 121 Several Iatin .American
countries, on the other hand, met Japanese canpetition in textiles
w1 th

a vigorous use of import duties and quotas.
Abandonment of convertibility sterrrned the decline in m:>ney

supplies i-mich occurred even in active countries during the -early stages
of the crisis.

By

the late 1930s, nx:mey supplies in active countries

exceeded 1929 levels.

Table 6 contrasts the CUban case, where money

supply shrank by about 40 percent,with those of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Interest rates for 1935-39

appear lower than those rep.;istered at the height of the crisis (1930-32),
and lower.than those of the late 1920s.

In Argentina, for example,

interest rates on 90 days tine deposits.were 6 percent at the end of
1929; averar;ed 4.3 percent during 1930-32; and oscillated between 2 and

3 percent for the rest of the decade.

-15Table 6
Ncminal Money Supply
(1929 = 100)

Argentina
Bt-azil
Uruguay

Chile
Colanbia
Mexico
CUba
United States

1925-29
100.oa
91.9
90.7
97.8b

lll.O
86.l
107.6
98.5

1930-34
90.6
108.8
103.2
109.0
92.6
97.i
56.7
83.0

1935-39
110.8
175.0
130.4
213.4
159.0
211.2

60.9
117.0

8Refers only to 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929
bRefers only to 1928 and 1929
Sources and method: Cuban data from Henry C. Wallich, ~tary Problems
of an Export Economy: The Cuban Experience 1914-1917, Cambridge, Harvard
· University Press, 1950, pp. 38-T6 and 152. Chilean data :f'ran P.T. Ellsworth,
2E_ cit, p. 171. United States data from Appendix A, Table A-1, in Milton
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz,. A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960, Princeton, Pr:inceton University Press, 1963. Mexican
data from Leopoldo Solis, I.a Realidad Economica Mexicana: Retrovision y
Perspectivas, Mexico DF, Siglo XX, 1970, pp. 104-105. Others from national
sources. Data refer to money supplies at the end of the yea:r. Definitions
of the stock of money vary slightly from country to country; definitions
are closest to "t•1i_".

-16'Ihere has been some controversy as to whether the active countries.
followed, during the early 1930s, fiscal policies which could be
characterized as 'Keynesiani~before-Keynes. '

The argwnent has

been most lively for Brazil, and centers on the magnitude of planned
fiscal deficits and their financing.

In his pioneering work Celso

Furtado argued that dcrnestic coffee price-support programs led to
fiscal deficits having an expansionary effect on aggregate demand.
later research noted that much of this expenditure was financed either
by new·taxes·or foreign loans. 131 It now appears that in Brazil
as well as in other countries, the.authorities remained on the whole
coomitted to fiscal orthodoxy, certainly during the early 1930s.
Large fiscal deficits financed by m:>ney creation occurred, but as a
result of unusual political circumstances, such as the Sao Paulo
rebellion in 1932; political tunnoil in Chile during late 1931 and
1932, including a short-lived socialist government; the war between
Peru and Colombia over Leticia in 1932; and the Second Ch aco War between
Bolivia and Paraguay, also in 1932.

In some countries. fiscal orthodoxy

was buttressed by rnerrories of massive public works and deficit~financing
during the 1920s by corrupt governments, such as the dictatorships of

Leguia in Peru and Machado in Cuba.
Even if there is little evidence that the full-employment fiscal
surplus was reduced to maintain aggregate demand, in m:>st activist
countries public expenditures seem to have been reduced by less.,
expanded more, than private expenditures.

or

The share of government in

GNP rose in all active countries during the 1930s. On the revenue side
there were important changes with the share of custan taxes falling,
as may be seen in the following data for Argentina and Brazil: 1 ~1 ·

-17Custom revenues as percentage
total current revenues
~ntina
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39

Brazil

58

51

44

43

33

42

Both Argentina and Brazil witnessed a remarkable expansion
1n non-customs current public revenues, which by 1932 (Argentina) and

1933 (Brazil) exceeded the levels reached 1n 1929,at current prices.
One may conjecture that fiscal policy 1n active cotmtries exerted
at least a modest balanced-budge t-multiplier type of expansionary effect
on aggregate demand during the early 1930s.

During the second half of

the decade such an effect was reinforced by a cautious increase in domes
tically-finance d deficits, a process encouraged by increasingly self
confident cheap-money policies isolated frc:m the rest of the ~orld by
exchange controls.
The rising share of public expenditure in GNP had more than Keynesian

significance.

Governments became carmitted to promoting both growth

and structural tra."1.sforrnation.

The Lazaro Cardenas administration (1934-

1940), for ex~le, accelerated the la.'1d reform program of the Mexican
Revolution,and 1n 1938 nationalized the petroleum industry.

Governmental

regulatory functions expanded; the 1930s also witnessed the strengthening
and creation of public institutions granting medium and long-term credits,
although the large-scale public involvenent in industrial credit was to
wait tmtil the 1940s •. In an interesting conjecture, Fernando Henrique
cardoso and Enzo Faletto have argued that.in countries where the export
economy was controlled by national groups that had succeeded in fonning
an 1Jrl)orta11t :industrial sector before the crisis, danestic policies took

-18on a more pro-private-enterprise cast, while in countries where exports
were controlled ma.inly by foreign-owned enclaves the state took a more
active role after the crisis relative to private enterprise.

But

the private sector was not excluded from economies where state par

ticipation was preponderant, nor was the public sector absent in the
initial stages of import substituting industrial1zation, even in countries
of liberal tradition. 151
Governments and public opinion showed a keener interest in
increasing the national share in value added by forei~-owned activities;
those enterprises also came under closer scrutiny and supervision by
host countries.

Some traditional export activities witnessed a rise

1n the share owned by danestic capitalists; that was the case, for
example, for Cuban sugar.
We can now summarize the automatic and policy-induced mechanisms

of adjustI?Ent triggered by the exogenous shocks Iatin America received
during 1929-33.

The increase in the international orice of manufactures

relative to that for primary products, which was expected to continue
for the foreseeable future, by itself encouraged the expansion of domestic
manufacturing at the expense of rural activities.

But besides manufactured

inportables and primary exportables, the Iatin American econan;y of the
1930s had a third category of goods which may be called non-traded.
Regardless of the exchange rate policy followed, a small country subject

to an exogenous worsening of _its international ternis of trade will
witness over the lor.p; run a decline in the price of its non-traded goods
relative to. the price of 1rnportable goods, further encouraging a rnove
nent of resources toward the import c~ting sector.

Under a gold

exchange standard with fixed rates and with collapsing international prices

-19for both imports and exports non-traded prices will have a long

wey

to fall; such denation is likely to be protracted and painful.
Countries willing and able to devalue their exchange rate can nnve
towan:1

the new constellatio n of relative prices speedily, lim:1ting

both price and monetary deflation.

This is what the active Lat:in

.American countries managed to do by 1931 at the latest, while
passive countries allowed price and monetary denation to run its
course.

'!he real exchange rates shO\m :1n Table 3 can be taken as proxies

for the domestic price of jn;)ortable goods relative to the non-traded
goods price.

It is only a proXY because it does not take into account

increzrents :1n protection, due either to tariffs or quantitativ e re
strictions, while using the United States cost of liv:ing as an :indicator

of internation al prices for Latin American importable goods. While
the.neglect of protection underestima tes the increase :1n the relative
price of jmportables , the second considerati on probably contributes
toward overestim3.tion.
Policy makers who permitted budget deficits, abandoned gold
convertibil ity,and allowed the exchange rate to depreciate did so,
on the whole, moved by survival instincts rather than inspired. by the
writings of economists, either defunct or live.

But in sane countries

· the :institution al structure was compatible with those actions, while

1n others it was not.
Performance
'!he 1930s belong to the pre-nationa l accounts era.

Table 7 pulls

together available ex-post estimates for G.D.P. growth during the 1930s
and 1940s. 'Ihe four largest Lat:1n American countries ( /1.rgentina, Brazil,

Colombia, and Mexico) do register growth rates superior to those of
canacta and the U.S.A. for the 1930s.

Neither the absolute G.D.P.

growth for the 1930s nor its level relative to the growth achieved

In the cases of Argentina

during the 1940s, however, are irq:>ressive.

· and Colombia, G.D.P. seems to have expanded during the 1920s at
clearly faster rates than those shown for the 1930s. For Brazil,

the major source used in Table 7 indicates an annual GDP growth rate
marginally higher for 1920-29 than for 1929-39; for Mexico the opposite
is the case cofTl)aring 1921-29 with 1929-39.
MeasureIIEnts of Gross tomestic Product do not take into account
losses of real income arising from deteriorating tenns of trade.

If

these were taken into account, the aggregate Latin .American performance
during the 1930s would look worse relative to those within the region
for the 1920s and 1940s, as well as in comparison with the industrialized
countries during the 1930s.
Table 8 subdivides the evolution of GDP into four plausible periods:
crisis (1929-33), recovery (1933-39),

war

(1939-45) and postwar (1945-49).

It can be argued that in several Latin .American countries recovery started
before 1933; data, however, do not waITant much preoccupation at this
stage with turning points.

Table 8 indicates that for the four largest

Latin American countries neither the crisis nor the recovery were as
sharp as those in Canada and the U.S.A.

It should be borne in mind that

value added in rural activities made up a large share of GDP in those
days; even for Argentina, the country with the highest e:.!:. capita incane, ·
.

rural activities made up nearly one quarter-of GDP in 1929, according

to the major source used 1n Tables 7 and 8.

-21Table 7
Real Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost
(Average annual percentage rates of change)

Argentina
Brazil

Chile
Colombia
Honduras
Mexico
Uruguay
USAc
canactac

1929-39
1.6%

1939-49
3.0%

3.0

3.8

oa

3.3d

3.8

3.7

-1.0

3.8

2.1
l.Ob

5.9
3.4

0.3
0.5

4.5
5.5

8Refers to 1929-40
bRefers to 1930-39
~fers to Gross National Product
~fers to 1940-49
Sources: Basic data for An?;ei1tina, Brazil, Chile (1940-49), Colombia,
Honduras, Mexico., Urur;:;ua_y (1939-49) obtained from: Naciones Unidas,
Cuadernos de la CEPAL, Series Historicas del Crecimiento de ftmerica
Latina, Santiago de Chile, 1978.
Basic data for Uruguay (1930-39) obtained from: Julio Millot, Carlos
Silva, Lindor Silva, El Desarrollo Industrial del Uruguay; de la
crisis de 1929 a la posp.:ueITa, Montevideo., Universidad de la Republica.,
Institute de Econornia., 1972., p.251., Cuadro #23.
Basic data for the USA obtained from: Council of Economic Advisers.,
Economic Report of the President, U.S. Government Printing Office.,
Washinc,nton, D.C. 1974.
Basic data for Canada obtained from: M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley.,
editors., Historical Statistics of Canada, Cambridge: At the University .
Press, 19b5, pp. 132 and 475.
· · ·
Basic data for Chile (1929-40) refers to an index for "aggregate" output,
made up by five basic sectors which during 1950-57 made up about one half
of Chilean GNP. See Marto A. Ballesteros and Tool E. Davis, "The Growth of
Oltput and Employment in Basic Sectors of the Chilean Econany., 1908-195711,
F.conanic Development and Cultural Chane;e, Vol..Xl, No.2,Part.I,Jan.1963,pp.152-177

-22Table 8

Peal Gross Domestic Product, At Factor Cost
(Total percentage changes)

1929-33

1933-39

1939-45

1945-49

-9.7%
9.9
-8.6
-10.3

29.2%
31.6
31.6
-2.0
37.2

Uruguay

na

na

Chileb

-36.9

50.6

13.2%
15.0
16.8
23.1
43.3
10.4
33.3

18.9%
26.5
23.3
18.6.
24.o
26.1
9.9

USAa

-30.5
-29.8

48.o
50.0

69.6
63.1

-8.8
5.1

Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Honduras
Mexico

2.6

Ganadaa

¾fers to Real Gross National Product
buntil 1945, Chilea~ data refers to the Ballesteros-Davis index
for "aggregate" output, made up by five basic sectors which during
1950-57 made up about one half of the Chilean GNP.
na = Data not available.
Sources:

As in Table

7.

-23Econanic performance during the 1930s for at least the largest
Latin American countries looks roore impressive when attention is
focussed on manufacturing.

While manufacturing growth during the

1940s exceeded that for the 1930s in roost countries, as shown in
Table 9; the Latin American growth rates clearly exceed those of

161 In the important case of Brazil,
Canada and the USA for the 1930s.
manufacturing growth during the 1930s was significant ly higher than
during

the 1920s (not shown); Colanbian industriali zation in the

1930s could not have been nuch behind the pace of the 1920s, if at
all.
It is generally accepted that pre-1929 Latin .Ameri~an manufacturing
grew pari passu with the rest of the basically export-orie nted economy.

Beyond sane moderate protectionis m, public policy departed little from

a neutral' attitude toward industry.

Irrportant segJnents·of manufacturing

relied directly on the export of (slightly) processed primary products;
exarrples include TIEat-packing plants in the River Plate and sugar mills
in several countries.

Growth of manufacturing during the recovery phase

of the 1930s relied overnhelmingly on import substitutio n.

Comparing

Tables 10 and 8 it may be seen that manufacturing expansion far exceeded
. ··-

,

that of GDP during 1933-39; note that this was not the case for Canada
and the USA.

Also in contrast with those two industrializ ed countries,

manufacturing growth during 1933-39 for roost Latin American countries
shown in Table 10 exceeded.th at achieved during-the war.
If there was an engine of growth in Latin .America during the 1930s,
that engine was· import substitutin g industriali zation.

Not surprisingl y,

the uneven perfonnance by different ·sectors implied by such a proposition
can also be found within manufacturing.

Even as sane manufacturing

-24Table 9
Real Manufacur.:tnr; Output at Factor Cost
(Average Annual Percentage Rates of Change)

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colanbia
Honduras
Mexico
Uruguay

Cuba

USAa
canaaaa

1929-39

1939-49

3.1%
5.0
3.3c
8.8
1.4
4.3
5.2b
-1-~

3.5%
4.8
6.7
6.1
7-5
5-7
-4. 8

-0.6

6.1

o.8

7.5

1.2

~fers to Index of Total Manufacturing Output·
bRefers to 1930-39

~fers to 1927-39
~fers to 1930-39
Sources: Basic data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico,
and Uruguay (1939-49) as in Table 7. Basic data for Uruguay (1930-39)
also as in Table 7.
Ba.sic data for Chile obtained frcm: Oscar Munoz G., Crec1rn1ento Industrial
de Chile 1914-1965, Santiago, Uriiversidad de Chile,·Instituto de Econamia
y Planificacion, 1968, pp. 160-161.
Ba.sic data for the USA and Cru1ada obtained as in Table 7
Ba.sic data for Cuba obtained from Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "An index of Cuban
industrial output, 1930-5811 , Chapter 3 in J.W. Wilkie and K. Ruddle, editors,
Quantitative Latin Ai~rican Studies , .Methods and Fincliw,s, Los ~eles,
UCLA La.tin .American Center Publications, 1977, Table 3-7, p.52. The index
refers to total industrial production.

-25Table 10
Real Manufacturing Outpu t, At Facto r Cost
(Total Percen tage Changes)

1929-33

1933-39

1939-45

1945-49

-6.5%
1.3
24.8
-13.2
-7.9

44.7%
60.4
86.0
32.5
65.3

14.6%
47.4
42.0
37.2
20.8
41.6
18.5
23.7
-9.2
7.6

Argen tina
Brazi l
Colan bia
Honduras
MeXico
Uruguay
Chile
Cuba

-6.4
-50.0b

37.7
73.4

23.5%
36.0
34.8
31.8
71.0
22.6
34.7
29.0

USAa
Canadaa

-38.6
-33.2

53.6
61.5

98.3
90.8

na

na

8Refe rs to Index of Total Manufacturing Output
bluffe rs to 1930-33
Sourc es: Basic data for Argen tina, Brazi l, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico,
and Uruguay obtain ed as in Table 7.
Ba.sic data for Chile obtain ed from: Oscar Munoz G., 2E. cit, pp. 160-16
1,
(for 1939-49); and from M.A. Balles teros and T.E. Davis, op cit, pp.
160-61

(for 1929-39).

Ba.sic data for USA and Canada as in Table 7.
Ba.sic data for Cuba as 1n Table 9

-26activities closely dependent on pre-1929 export-oriented prosperity
were shrinking, other activities (sanetimes a handful) made dramatic
output advances during the 1930s.

Such lea.dine sectors typically

included textiles, building materials (especially cement), petroleum
refining, tires, toiletries and food processing for the bane market •
.Aroong these activities, textiles appear as quantitatively the most

inportant, often providing nnre than 20 percent of the net expansion of
value added in manufacturing and growing at annual rates above 10-percent
during

the 1930s.

The main exception seems to have been Brazil., where

earlier industrialization in the consumer goods sectors of textiles,
shoes, clothing and foodstuffs meant that during the 1930s the rost
rapidly growing industries were those producing intennediate and
capital goods. 171
'lhe industrialization drive of the 1930s seems to have been quite

labor-intensive and based on small and medium sized finns,
created.

many

newly

It has been est:1ma.ted, for example, that fran 1930 to 1937

total industrial errployment in Sao Paulo grew at a rate of 10.9 percent
18/
per year; the output elasticity of employment was cµJout one.Real
wages appear to have been relatively constant in most coi.mtries., with
the stagnant primary sector providing an aJll)le reservoir of workers and
also on the whole an elastic supply of foodstuffs.

This view is

consistent with the changes 1n relative prices noted earlier, with
both the prices of exportable and non-traded goods falling relative
to those of inportable goods,

the most.

w1 th

prices for exportable goods falling

-27'Ihe

industrializati on drive squeezed installed capacity; there

are frequent reports of textile mills working two and three shifts
even

in the early 1930s.

In the Brazilian and Peruvian cases the

mediocre 1920s left substantial excess capacity.

Statistics do not

show an upsurge in imports of machinery and equipment, although one
may

conjecture that there were substantial changes in the canposition

of these imports between the 1920s and 1930s.
'!here are indications that the import-substitu ting drive relied
heavily on new entrepreneurs, including fresh inrnigrants fran the
troubled Europe of the 1930s. 'l'here was direct foreign investment in
inport-substitu tion, 191 but its role seems relatively smaller than
l'lha.t was to be in later years.
Internationally canparable data are available for the cement
industry, which in sane ways can be taken as representative of the 1930s
industrial success stories (although it was mre capital-intensi ve and
foreign-dominated than the textile industry).

Table 11 presents apparent

cerrent consumption first; on the whole, it confirms the hypothesis
that larger and active countries perfonned better than North America
and than smaller and passive Latin American countries, even if the

irrplied annual growth rate of apparent consumption is far from spec
tacular.

What is spectacular is the evolution of the share of con

sumption supplied domestically, shown in the last two columns, and

the implied growth rates in cement prcx:luction between 1928-29 and
1937-38.

During those nine years cement output multiplied by mre

than 14 times in Colanbia, by IIDre than"6 t1rnes in.Brazil and by
al.m:)st 4 t1rnes in Argentina.

By 1937-38 the large and active Latin

-28Table 11
CenEnt: Consumption and Output
Apparent CerrEnt
Consumption in

1937-38
(1928-29=100)
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colanbia
Mexico
Peru

153
112
114
118
148
136

D:mestic Output
as Percentage of
Apparent
Cons1.ID1ption

1928-29
37
16
43
6

1937-38
92
91
99
74
97
66
90

Uruguay

77

88
46
81

CUba
I.:aninican Republic
Haiti
Central American Republics (six)

34

93

74

0

93
0

58
100

0

0

12

11

canada
USA

51
63

Source: Basic data in physical magnitudes obtained from the European
CerrEnt Association, ~-Cement ~ket in Fi~es, Paris 1974.
Apparent consumption refers to cement production plus imports less exports.

-29American countries had becane practically self-sufficient in cement.
Such rapid transfonnation., incidentally, leaves one a bit puzzled
as to the ba.ITiers to greater local cement production during 1928-29
in countries such as Brazil and Colombia., especially in contrast with

the Cuban and Mexican cases.

Proximity to the USA

may

have encouraged

greater direct foreign.investment in cement in the last two countries
before the Great Depression.

Changes in income distribution during the 1930s are unclear.
In the industrial sector higher prices for in:port-cc:mpeting goods.

canbined with
profits.

a fairly

elastic labor supply must have generated large

Yet in:portant redistributive structural changes occurred in

the rural sectors of a number of countries, partly induced by the
weakening of traditional land-intensive exports.

Thorp and Bertram

note that in Peru with the decline of the landowners' authority there
was an increase in the equality of the distribution of rural income;

a similar trend appears to have taken place in Cuba.

The acceleration

1n the Mexican land reform has already been noted; in Colanbia the Alfonso

Lopez administration carried out less drama.tic but significant land
and tax ref0IT.1S .20/
To

si.mnarize regarding performance:

during the 1930s large and

active Latin .Arrerican economies showed an in:pressive capacity to
transform, generating new leading sectors within manufacturing.

By

the late 1930s those economies had becane m:::,re self-reliant; 1n spite
of GDP growth., in:port volumes (with 1928-29=100) by 1938-39 had
dropped to 72 in Argentina, 7D 1n Brazil, 87 in Colanbia, 56 in Chile.,

and 72 1n Mexico (data as in Table 1). The perfonnance of small

-30and passive economies seems to have been poorer.

Even though traces

of response to the new constellation of international prices can
also be seen in those econanies, and although they appear to have
also engaged in some :irq:>ort substitution (even in

Cuba

import-replacin g

activities such as milk-processing and cotton cloth expanded rapidly)
those efforts were weak relative to both the depressive forces
originating in their primary sectors and to the industrializati on
drives of the active and large countries.

In those small countries

with a large and flexible subsistence sector, in Central .America
the welfare consequences of this involution were better than in Cuba,
where the rural sector provided little roan for those unemployed in
export and related activities.

It

may

also be noted that sane small

countries which were then outright colonies, such as Jamaica, Puerto
Rico, and the Phillipines benefitted fran 1930s metropolitan pro
tectionism.

'Ihus Puerto Rican and Phillipino sugar exports rose while

those of Cuba sank, and Jamaican banana exports to Britain gained at
the expense of those frcm Central America.

'lhere is truth in the assertion that the Latin American countries
which performed reasonably well during the 1930s were those which had
large domestic markets and some pre-1929 industrial base, as in the
cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.

But this fails to

explain the contrasting performance of Chile and Uruguay, on one side,
versus that of Cuba.

'lhese three countries in 1929 had reached

roughly s1milar levels of population and income.

In contrast with

Chile and Uruguay, however, Cuba did not have a·Central Bank during
the 1930s, maintained its currency rigidly pegged to the U.S. dollar

-31and, as already noted, actually lowered tariffs 1n 1934.

One

may

conclude that a m1n1rnum size in the danestic market plus a m1n1rnum
degree of autonany regarding the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary
policies were necessary conditions for industrialization during the
1930s 1n Latin America.
Final Observations
The key role given in this paper to the exchange rate as a

variable which can st:1mulate growth and avoid monetary deflation

may

be found 1n the literature, both for Latin America and elsewhe~.
and Anna Jacobson Schwartz have noted that from 1929
l-11.lton Friedman
.'
to 1931 China was hardly affected internally by the crisis; China
had a silver standard which was equivalent to a floating exchange rate
with respect to gold-staridard countries.

I'Ur.ing

1929-31 its currency

luckily depreciated, a situation reversed When Britain and then the
21/
.
United States abandoned the gold standard.- The silver standard
had served well countries adhering to it 1n an earlier Great Depression;
during 1873-94 incane grew significantly rrore rapidly 1n silver221
standard countries than in those adhering to the gold standard.
'Ihe good perfonnance of the Swedish econany during the 1930s has been

231
credited in part to the large depreciation of the krona in 1931.
fudley Seers used a typology similar to that used in this paper to discuss
I.atin American economic perfonnance during 1929-58, grouping together
eleven countries followinp; a dollar exchange standard, which con
sistently had high dollar or gold backing for the local currency
and littie exchange control.

He also notes that governments of these

countries made only sparing use of import quotas or tariffs, partly
because the application of trade controls was restricted by various
2
reciprocaJ. agreerrents w1 th the United States. lV

-32Most mainstream economists, whether of the 1930 or 1980 vintage,
would be inclined to give Latin American countries policy advice
based on international trade and finance nod.els using the small

country assumption.

Trade theory asserts that a truly small country

facing perfectly elastic demands and supplies for its exports and

inports, respectively, should follow the same trade policy, e.g.,
free trade, regardless of what is going on in the rest of the world.
Uncertainty as to the tenns of trade will not change matters ITn.lch
unless one is willing to attribute to govenirrent insights unavailable

to the private sector.

International f:inance theory adds that a

small country will (and should) have little control over exchange

rate and ronetary policy; pegging to a key currency and following
'gold-exchange standard' monetary rules,includ1ng free convertibility,
are the usual prescriptions for the small, regardless of external
circumstances.
Like Walrasian auction markets, smallness in foreign trade and
finance is a powerful theoretical construct which may be more insightful
in sane circumstances than others.

In a world of trade quotas,

convertibility restrictions or foreign tariffs which are ~osed
depending on the success of one's export.drives, it could be that not
· even Andorra is srnall.

Optimum currency area theory, stiITn.llating as

it is, gives little practical guidance for drawing the line between
small pereers and large flexers.

The Latin .American experience. of the 1930s

shows that smallness in foreign trade and finance is not an intrinsic
and permanent characteristic of a country, but a result of specific

conditions in the world econorey and changing danestic circumstances.

-33Foreign trade and payrrents policy for a Latin American-type econcrny
should depend on what is expected to happen in (and on unexpected
shocks caning frcm)the rest of the world.
'!he fine-tuning of international trade and financial policies

could lead to extreme protectionism and the loss of ''nnneyness" for
the national currency.

Many

Latin American countries during the

1940s and 1950s carried to excess policies initiated during the 1930s,
even as world markets became roore buoyant.

But the advice that

developing countries.shou ld design their trade and financial. policies
as if the state of the world economy did not matter (or as if they

were small at all times) suggests evangelical fervor rather than
scientific analysis or historical knowledge.
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The eleven countries are Venezuela, Guba,

Guatemala, Dorn.1nican Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Panama, Haiti and Honduras.

Seers argued: "The eleven cotmtries •••

were politically better able than the rema.1ning republics of La.tin
.AnErica to face stagnation or decline m dcmestic mcornes, such as is
involved for countries on the dollar-exchanr,;e standard if their exports
stagnate or declme.

Profits of foreign compa'"lies m export industries

absorb a high proportion of export fluctuations, a big fraction of
the labour force is in the subsistence sector (or can return to it),
and the worldng classes have little political power" (p. 185).

